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Bill Hamilton, one of the most influential Darwinian thinkers of our time, was, above all, immensely curious. He was intrigued by nature s riddles, whether they arose in his backyard or in the faraway rain forests of Brazil or Africa, where he recently came to his tragic death. Walking with him in the woods or in the desert, sometimes even in a crowded street in the midst of a city, one had to expect an adventure; an uncommon beetle or some unexplained behavior of a bird could turn an innocent journey into a research expedition.
There was a continuity between the curiosity of the person as revealed in his backyard research, and the most basic questions dealt with in his scientific work. Why do we grow old (Hamilton 1966) ? Why does the sex ratio come close to even in one population but deviate from it in another (Hamilton 1967) ? Why is it that we so often observe gregarious behavior of a potential prey when such behavior could apparently only be of advantage to its predator (Hamilton 1971a, b) ? Why is it that the investment in dispersal is so often high even in cases where the expected reproductive success far from home is apparently no larger than it is close to home May 1977, 1980) ? And finally, a central theme in his last 20 years of research -Why do we reproduce sexually (e.g. Hamilton, 1980, Hamilton et. al, 1981, Hamilton and  Zuk 1982 and many later works)? Hidden in these papers are many concepts and ideas that later would become widely accepted as being central to the quantitative theory of evolution. Perhaps the most prominent example is that of the Unbeatable Strategy (Hamilton 1967) , which foreshadowed the future development of the concept of ESS (Maynard Smith and Price 1973 ). Yet, for most biologists and social scientists, Hamilton s name was, and still is, connected most intimately with the evolution of altruistic behavior (Hamilton 1963 I, II, 1970 , 1971b , 1972 . In the present note we concentrate on that part of his work. However, almost any subject that he studied can be interpreted in terms of the basic philosophy that led him to his insights about the evolution of altruistic traits.
2 Altruistic traits, a term first coined by Haldane (1932) , are those that decrease the fitness of their carrier but increase that of other individuals in the population. While still an undergraduate student in Cambridge, Hamilton wondered how can natural selection maintain traits that, even if advantageous for the population, apparently reduce the number of their carriers below their share in the population? The answer he gave to this question is now referred to as Hamilton s rule: An inherited behavior is selected for in a population if and only if it results in an increase in the number of genes, identical by descent to those of the individual doing that behavior, namely those genes carried by the offspring of the individual in question or by its other relatives. To measure the effect of one's behavior on the number of his or her genes in the population, Hamilton first employed Wright s kinship coefficient (Wright 1922) , measuring relatedness by the chance r that an allele carried by one individual would be identical by descent to an allele carried by its relative. Employing this measure of relatedness, Hamilton concluded that natural selection would favor altruism toward a relative if and only if the ratio between the cost to the helper and the benefit to that relative were less than r, cost and benefit being measured in terms of fitness.
This answer became one of the central dogmas of the modern theory of evolution.
It has undergone many revisions and, in some technical aspects, remains controversial.
However, this reason for the evolution of an individually deleterious trait in a population has now become part of the general knowledge of any modern student of evolution. But this was far from the case in 1964. Reproductive restraints that prevent overpopulation, behavioral or even physiological mechanisms minimizing harm inflicted on co-species opponents, eusocial behavior in hymenoptera and termites, While Fisher (1930 Fisher ( , 1958 and Wright (1948) had already shown this sort of argument to be false, their theoretical work was never accepted by Cambridge biologists of the time as having any empirical relevance (to be distinguished from Fisher s well-accepted contributions to statistical inference). To illustrate this attitude, Hamilton (1996) Under the influence of Fisher, it was clear to Hamilton, even as a student, that no genetically inherited trait disfavored by natural selection within a population can possibly be maintained in a population only because of its importance to the future survival of this population. Yet he realized that the alternative to group selection might not be restricted to individual selection. The kin selection mechanism described above, first suggested in his 1963 paper, was based on the gene rather than on the individual as a unit of selection. Later, this led Dawkins (1976) to use the term selfish gene for any allele under natural selection, a reemphasis of Hamilton s belief that altruistic traits could only evolve on the individual level, if they allow the spread of the selfish allele which determines them. 4 Hamilton is often misleadingly regarded an advocate of a view that places the evolution of altruistic traits at the center of the Darwinian theory of natural selection. This is far from the truth. Haldane (1932) had attempted unsuccessfully to model the evolution of altruism, but few scholars (e.g., Williams 1966) recognized the importance of the phenomenon and the need to explain its evolution in quantitative terms. A fact quite often overlooked is that Hamilton s rule was suggested not only as a sufficient but also as a necessary condition for the evolutionary success of an altruistic trait, a condition that in most natural situations is not easily met. It is thus worth recalling that this very rule was employed to predict the limitation of workers altruism in ants nests (Hamilton 1971b (Hamilton , 1972 as well as that of parents toward their offspring (Trivers 1974) . Also important is the crucial role of Hamilton s rule in clarifying a much wider range of conditions under which only those traits that exclusively promote the welfare of their individual carrier can evolve. This point is illustrated by the way different authors have treated the phenomenon of gregarious behavior of a potential prey. As mentioned by Hamilton (1971a) Hesse et al (1937) and Lorenz (1966) have admitted that the nature of the group advantage remains obscure in many cases.
Indeed, one (though not the only) possible advantage to the aggregation as a whole , suggested by Lorenz, was that of mutual defense against predators. The theoretical difficulty of the individual advantage of defection in such cases was not even realized as a problem by Lorenz. He was perplexed, instead, by those cases in which there appeared to be no mutual defense on part of the potential prey, in some of which gregarious behavior appears just to facilitate predation. Hamilton, however, addressed both cases. On one hand, an apparently altruistic tendency toward mutual 5 defense is well predicted by the theory of kin-selection, in relatively small groups of more or less permanent structure (Hamilton 1963 I, II 1970 , 1971b , 1972 see also Trivers 1971 and Axelrod and for the possibility of reciprocal altruism in this case). On the other hand, this is not likely to occur in large anonymous aggregations; this was the subject of Hamilton s article On the geometry of the selfish herd (1971a), from which the quotation in the previous paragraph is taken. As
Hamilton explained, the possible group-detrimental behavior of the aggregation is an inevitable result of the individually advantageous (hence selfish) behavior of each member of it. Struggling to be as close as possible to other members of the aggregation, preferably in the middle of it, such a member thereby seeks the relative safety from being the first taken by the predator.
Here, instead of the prey-predator two-player game tacitly envisaged by Lorenz,
Hamilton developed his analysis in terms of the spatial structure of a population game in which the payoff is individual survival and the players are the potential members of the aggregation. He again used the population game structure (Hamilton 1967) , and with his concept of unbeatable strategy he anticipated the later applications of game theory to evolutionary reasoning by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) .
To those who knew Hamilton, his approach of first resorting to the simplest explanation of direct individual selection was quite natural. Actually, it was just this approach that led him to look for deeper explanations when direct individual selection appeared to fail. This was indeed the case with apparently altruistic behavior for which one of the first examples given in his 1964 article was that of warning calls. shown to cause a female-biased sex ratio.
Widely observed over-investment in seed dispersal was explained by Hamilton, in collaboration with May, on the basis of two factors, both, again, invoking the gene's view . First, dispersal gives the advantage of competing for new sites in which the migratory allele is under-represented May 1977, 1980) . Then, in a distant empty site, the advantage in terms of future dispersal of genes is likely to be larger than can be accounted for by the success of one seed. Indeed, a new empty site may provide better conditions for future descendents.
A variation of this latter argument is repeated as a crucial component of Hamilton s combined theory for the evolution of sexual reproduction and sexual selection. On the face of it, these two appeared to be contradictory. On the one hand, Hamilton s theory for the evolution of sexual reproduction assumes that the pressure of continuously evolving parasites on a currently successful combination of genes is the most crucial factor of natural selection. Sex and recombination, according to this view, are tools to get rid of the currently successful combinations of genes (sooner or later to become obsolete) without eliminating the genes involved in these 7 combinations. Yet Hamilton s theory for the evolution of sexual preference assumes, quite on the contrary at first sight, that male sexual display is aimed to demonstrate immunity to parasites now present in the population. But this immunity would be characteristic of exactly that combination of genes soon to become deleterious and hence to be discarded by recombination and natural selection. The resolution of the apparent contradiction is again based on the concept of the long-term perspective of the gene rather than on that of the individual. It was shown by Eshel and Hamilton (1984) , that even when recombination does not increase the average fitness of the direct offspring (and, under predict selective advantage to a high level of altruism on that island. Yet it is easy to see that if a gene for highly competitive or even spiteful behavior were carried by some of the sibs, it would be the one to survive on that island. Another crucial question raised more generally was how far back should one look for common descent.
Going back far enough, it might be that all members of a species would be found to be close relatives, much like the imaginary sibs on the island. This question appeared to be especially important in highly inbred, spatially structured, non-panmictic populations, and these soon became a major arena for the study of altruistic traits.
Moreover, concentrating the focus on such populations, the most apparent examples of biological altruism were those of physiological or biochemical altruism such as and was convinced to re-define relatedness so as to adjust the concept of inclusive fitness to the dynamics predicted by this new formula. This was done by defining relatedness as the regression coefficient of the number of representatives of a given allele, carried by one individual, on the number of representatives of this same allele, carried by its relative (Hamilton 1970 (Hamilton , 1972 . In the absence of selection, this regression coefficient is easily shown to be uniquely defined, regardless of the locus and of the distribution of alleles carried at this locus in the population. Moreover, with random mating, the regression coefficient is equal to Wright s coefficient of relatedness, employed by Hamilton in his 1964 paper. From Price s formula it followed that, given this regression coefficient, selection should always operate to increase the inclusive fitness. Hence Hamilton s rule was re-established without resorting to the ambiguous concept of identity by descent. As an important byproduct, the concept of relatedness was now extended to include neighbors in spatially structured populations. In this way, Hamilton s rule could now be used to account for group selection and the evolution of non-directed altruism (see also Uyenoyama and Feldman 1980) . This criticism was rejected by Maynard Smith (1980) , who favored inclusive fitness models over the exact population genetic framework that deals with individual 10 fitnesses because the approximations inherent in the latter produce significantly simpler analysis, especially for relatives more distant than first degree. Even when strong selection forces in several loci are involved, one can easily verify that the only unbeatable strategies (Hamilton 1967 ) in a population game of the prisoner s dilemma among relatives are those (either Help or Defect ) that maximize one s inclusive fitness. In other words, this is the only strategy that, when fixed in the population, is immune to any non-epistatic mutation that affects the relevant behavior of its carrier. As mentioned elsewhere (Eshel 1997) , Hamilton s concept of unbeatable strategy corresponds to the process of long-term evolution, according to which (rare) occasionally successful mutations, followed by natural selection, repeatedly shift the population from the vicinity of one (short term) genetic equilibrium to that of another. An important question, concerning long-term evolution and inclusive fitness, is whether monomorphic genetic equilibria that maximize the
